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Notes and Comments
Media In The Spotlight: Private
Parties Liable For Violating
The Fourth Amendment
I. INTRODUCTION
The media plays an important role in our society. The media
gathers information and disseminates it to the public. The public
relies on the media to keep it up to date on current events and
world affairs. However, with the advent of the paparazzi and "re-
ality based" television programs, the focus has shifted from the
news to the media itself.
During the past few years there has been a dramatic increase
in the number of television programs that depict the activities of
law enforcement officers.' In an effort to promote realism, as well
as to satiate the public's desire for entertainment, the media has
become more aggressive and intrusive in its newsgathering tech-
niques. 2 Not only have television scenes of police officers appre-
hending suspects become commonplace, such scenes have become
1. See Elsa Y. Ransom, Home: No Place for "Law Enforcement Theatricals-
The Outlawing of Police/Media Home Invasions in Ayeni v. Mottola, 16 Loy. LA.
Ent. L.J. 325 (1995) (stating that at the meeting of the National Association of
Television Program Executives in 1995, fifteen new reality-based entertainment
programs were unveiled.); see also Kevin E. Lunday, Permitting Media Participa-
tion in Federal Searches: Exploring the Consequences for the United States Follow-
ing Ayeni v. Mottola and a Framework for Analysis, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 278, 308
nn.3 & 5 (1997) (defining "reality" television as programs featuring actual video
footage of police during performance of their duties and "reality-based" programs
as programs that recreate police incidents).
2. See Ransom, supra note 1, at 325 (indicating that the public has a
voracious appetite for this type of entertainment-and producers are eager to sat-
isfy); see also Brad M. Johnston, The Media's Presence During The Execution Of A
Search Warrant: A Per Se Violation Of The Fourth Amendment, 58 Ohio St. L.J.
1499, 1500 (1997).
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more intrusive as the media crew now follow the police into the
home in order to provide full coverage. 3
Imagine that it is the middle of the night and you are sleeping
in your bed. You are awakened by noises coming from your living
room. Still in your pajamas, you get out of bed to investigate. You
are greeted by men with drawn guns; flashbulbs go off in your face.
Through the chaos, you learn that the police are in your home exe-
cuting a search warrant. This is not a nightmare-this is real, and
it is a violation of your Fourth Amendment rights.4
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a redress for this infringement of
your Constitutional right; however, until recently, 42 U.S.C. §
1983 was only used against the police in this scenario. The media,
as a private entity, could not be held liable for infringing upon your
Constitutional rights.5 Recently, however, plaintiffs have been su-
ing the media, as well as the government actors, under § 1983 and
the courts appear willing to entertain this cause of action against
private parties in certain circumstances. Part II of this Comment
will briefly review the background of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of
action and how it may apply to private actors. Part III will ex-
amine recent court cases that have deemed the media state actors
for purposes of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 6 and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 actions, as well as those cases that have not held the
media to be a state actor. By comparing these cases, we can deter-
mine what action by the media will be deemed state action. Part
IV will explore whether the media, deemed a state actor, is entitled
to qualified immunity. Part V will discuss whether the media,
deemed a state actor, is entitled to a good faith defense. Finally,
Part VI will look at the reasons why a plaintiff would bring forth
3. See Ransom, supra note 1, at 325.
4. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (holding that "it is a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other
third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of
the third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant").
5. The purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the
badge of authority to deprive individuals of federally guaranteed rights. See Wyatt
v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
6. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for
injuries sustained due to the federal agent's violation of the plaintiffs Fourth
Amendment rights). Bivens applies to federal actors, whereas 42 U.S.C. § 1983
applies to state actors. See id. Hereinafter, only 42 U.S.C. § 1983 will be
mentioned.
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a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action when a common law tort action is
available.
IL 42 U.S.C. § 1983 LiALITY FOR PRIVATE ACTORS
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows a plaintiff to seek money damages
from government officials who have violated his or her Constitu-
tional rights.7 Historically, government actors were the only par-
ties that could be held liable under this statute. Today, however,
private parties may also be liable under this section if they are
deemed to have acted under color of law.8
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,9 the United States Supreme
Court set forth a two-part test for determining whether a private
individual acted under color of state law.10 The first prong re-
quires that the claimed deprivation result from the exercise of a
right or privilege having its source in state authority.11 In other
words, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some
right or privilege created by the state, by a rule of conduct imposed
7. Section 1983 of 42 U.S.C. states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capac-
ity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Co-
lumbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
8. See, e.g., Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1976) (owners who
obtained police assistance in evicting tenants were deemed joint actors with the
police).
9. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
10. Plaintiff brought this action under an 1871 civil rights statute against a
corporate creditor, alleging that the defendants, by attaching his property before
judgment, had acted jointly with the state to deprive him of his property without
due process of law. The complaint was dismissed by the District Court. The Court
of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was deprived of his
property through state action. The defendants acted under color of state law in
participating in that deprivation, and the plaintiff presented a valid cause of action
insofar as he challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia statute. See id. at
925-42.
11. See id. at 939.
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by the state or by a person for whom the state is responsible. 12 The
second prong requires that the party charged be a "state actor."13
This latter prong does not require that the accused be an officer of
the state, but rather it is enough that he is a willful participant in
joint activity with the state or its agents.14 In deciding whether
private party conduct amounts to being a "state actor," courts en-
gage in a highly factual inquiry. 15
III. Is THE MEDIA A PERSON ACTING UNDER COLOR OF LAW FOR
PURPOSES OF § 1983?
There has been very little consensus on whether or not mem-
bers of the media can be deemed government actors for purposes of
42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, courts have deemed the media govern-
ment actors when certain factors are present. This section of the
Comment takes a look at cases that have dealt with media liability
under § 1983 in order to determine what those factors are.
There is a trend toward holding media liable for a civil rights
violation when there is a close relationship between the media and
the government agents during the action in question. This will re-
quire a factual determination in each case. It is clear that the
courts will look for some type of an agreement between the media
and the government agency-be it oral or written-that provides the
media with some special privilege to which other private parties
are not entitled. For example, in Berger v. Hanlon,16 the Ninth
12. See id. at 937.
13. See id. at 939.
14. See id. at 941.
15. See Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997). Four tests have been
developed to answer this question: the governmental nexus test (courts must con-
sider whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the action of
the regulated entity so that the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state);
the public function test (state action is present when a private entity exercises
functions traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state); the state compulsion
test (a state can be held responsible for a private act only when it has exercised
coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement that the choice
must be deemed to be that of the state); and the joint action test (private actors can
be considered government actors if they are willful participants in joint action with
the government or its agents). The joint action test was the appropriate test in
this case. See id. at 514. The Supreme Court has said that the joint action test is
satisfied when the plaintiff establishes an agreement or conspiracy between a gov-
ernment actor and a private party. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28
(1980).
16. 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Circuit held that Cable News Network (CNN) agents were govern-
ment actors for purposes of a civil rights claim. 17 The Ninth Cir-
cuit found that there was not only a verbal, but a written
agreement between the government and the media to engage
jointly in an enterprise that only the government could law-
fully institute-the execution of a search warrant.1 S In Barrett v.
Outlet Broadcasting Inc.,i s the children of a suicide victim
brought a § 1983 action against a city and members of its police
department, alleging that police employees permitted a news
crew to enter the victim's home, film the scene of a suicide and
broadcast those pictures on television. 20 The District Court
of Ohio held that the news crew acted under color of state
law and could thus be held liable under § 1983. In doing so, the
court found that there was an agreement between the police and
the media that granted "special privileges" to the media.21 These
17. In this case, former employees of the Bergers told the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service (USFWS) that they had seen Mr. Berger poison and/or shoot
eagles a few years prior. Cable News Network (CNN) heard about the investiga-
tion and asked agents of the USFWS if they could work out a deal where CNN
could get footage for their programs. The Assistant U.S. Attorney and CNN's cor-
respondent executed an agreement that allowed CNN to accompany USFWS
agents as they executed the search warrant. A judge issued a search warrant for
the Berger's ranch, which did not include the Bergers' home. The judge issuing the
warrant was unaware of CNN's participation. See id. at 505-09.
18. See id. at 515.
19. 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
20. This action arose out of the ride-along policy of the Columbus Police De-
partment (CPD). This policy allowed observers to accompany police officers while
the officers perform their public duties. The defendant, a reporter for a news sta-
tion owned by defendant Outlet Broadcasting, contacted the CPD and asked per-
mission to ride along with the Homicide Squad. The reporter explained his desire
to do a local news program that would tie into the premiere of the national pro-
gram "Homicide: Life on the Streets." The reporter explained to CPD that in order
to do the story correctly, he would need to have "unrestricted access." CPD claims
that it gave the defendant permission to ride with homicide detectives, but that it
only gave him two special privileges: first, to ride to crime scenes with the homi-
cide detectives, and second to enter the restricted area of the Detective Bureau.
CPD also alleges that the defendant was told that when he arrived at a crime
scene, he would be treated like any other reporter. This, he claimed, meant that
the defendant would not be allowed inside the police tape. CPD claims that the
defendant agreed to the conditions. The defendant claims that CPD never set
these restrictions. The defendant believed that he was authorized to follow the
homicide detectives wherever they went. See id. at 730-31.
21. See id. at 735.
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privileges included access to the home as well as to the suicide
scene.
22
Courts will also inquire into whether or not the media and the
government are acting to help one another achieve the other's goal.
For example, in Lauro v. New York, 23 the plaintiff brought a § 1983
action against the city and a city police officer, alleging that the
plaintiff was deprived of his constitutional rights when he was ar-
rested and forced to take part in a "perp walk."24 Although the
question was not before the court, the court stated that Fox 5 News
could also be held liable for this constitutional violation. 25 In a
footnote, the court said that holding Fox 5 liable as a state actor
"would not be farfetched in this case given that Fox 5 News ap-
pears to have encouraged, and participated in, the perp walk con-
ducted by [the police]."26 The court said that the police assisted
the media in sensationalizing the facts of the case and that it was
unlikely that the police would have conducted the perp walk with-
out the participation and encouragement of the media.27
Also, in Berger, the court found that the government agents
and the media acted "for the mutual benefit of the media and the
government officials' interest in publicity."28 The Ninth Circuit
stated that the record in the case suggested that the government
officers planned and executed the search in a manner designed to
22. See id. (stating that without the collusion of the state actors, the media
defendants would not have been able to gain access to the home and residence of
the victim).
23. 39 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
24. The plaintiff was taken to the Nineteenth precinct in New York City
where he remained for several hours. Detectives questioned plaintiff with regard
to several thefts at the building in which he worked. Plaintiff disputes that he was
read his Miranda rights at this point. After two hours of questioning, the detective
received a call from the Police Department's Office of the Deputy Commissioner of
Public Information informing him that the media was interested in plaintiffs case,
and that plaintiff should be taken on a "perp walk." A "perp walk" is a Police
Department term that refers to walking an arrestee outside the precinct pursuant
to a request from the media. The plaintiff was handcuffed, escorted out the front
door, and outside of the precinct; the plaintiff was then placed into an unmarked
car, driven around the block, and walked back into the precinct. The plaintiff was
filmed by a television crew from Fox 5 News outside the precinct building during
this procedure. The footage from this "perp walk" was shown on the Fox 5 News.
See id. at 357.
25. See id. at 365.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Berger, 129 F.3d at 515.
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enhance its entertainment value rather than its law enforcement
value.29 In coming to this conclusion, the court viewed those con-
versations between the officers and the plaintiff, whose purpose
was to provide interesting soundbites, as well as to portray the of-
ficers as tough, caring investigators, rather than to further the in-
vestigation.30 In Barrett, the court found that the police assisted
the media by conducting a staged interview with a witness, as well
as by pretending not to know who the victim was while searching
the victim's purse in order to find identification, thus enhancing
the entertainment value.3 1 The court said that there was no ques-
tion that the media could not have engaged in this unconstitu-
tional action without the authority and cooperation of the police.3 2
Also, in Ayeni v. CBS, Inc.,33 agents, accompanied by a television
crew, executed a search warrant at the plaintiffs home to search
for fraudulently obtained credit cards.34 The District Court did not
expressly hold that CBS was acting under color of law; however,
the court concluded that CBS violated a clearly established Fourth
Amendment right and denied CBS qualified immunity since it was
29. The day before the execution of the search warrant, the agents and CNN
held a pre-search briefing at which the agents shared the contents of the search
warrant. On the morning of the search, the agents and CNN held a briefing to
discuss the execution of the warrant. This event was videotaped by CNN. Media
cameras were placed on the outside and inside of the government vehicles, which
documented the agents' every move. A special agent was wired with a hidden
microphone which transmitted live audio to the CNN crew. The agents met Mr.
Berger on the road leading to the ranch. They asked him for his consent to enter
his home. He consented. The conversations that took place in the home were
transmitted to CNN via the hidden microphone. The Bergers were not informed
that the agent was wearing a microphone or that the cameras belonged to CNN.
CNN recorded more than eight hours of footage and broadcasted the video and
recordings. See id. at 509.
30. See id. at 515.
31. See Barrett, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 736.
32. See id. at 735.
33. 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
34. A government agent obtained a search warrant based upon information
regarding Mr. Ayeni's involvement in a credit card fraud operation. The warrant
authorized agents to enter the plaintiffs apartment and to search for evidence of
credit card fraud. The plaintiff, Ms. Ayeni, was not under investigation for any
illegal activity. The plaintiff and her son were home alone when the search was
conducted. Ms. Ayeni was wearing only a dressing gown. The agents never identi-
fied the camera crew as CBS employees. Ms. Ayeni believed that the CBS camera
crew and defendant were part of the team executing the warrant. Ms. Ayeni ob-
jected to the camera. She repeatedly requested that her picture not be taken and
attempted to cover her face and that of her son. The CBS crew followed and taped
the agents as they searched the apartment. See id. at 364-65.
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not a government official.3 5 Although the court did not go through
the color of law analysis, it seems that CBS presumed it was acting
under color of law and argued for qualified immunity. The court
also alluded to the fact that CBS might have acted under color of
law when the court said: "at the very least, the plaintiffs are enti-
tled to discovery in order to determine whether there was any jus-
tification for this intrusion of CBS into their home with the aid of a
government official."36 Once the court denied CBS qualified immu-
nity, CBS settled the case.
In essence, the courts will determine whether or not the gov-
ernment was acting independently of the media. The Ninth Cir-
cuit said that the media in Berger "collaborated with the
government in order to conduct a search for its own benefit-there
was nothing passive about the government's involvement with the
media in this case."37 In fact, the court noted that that the federal
agents shared confidential information with the media.38 Al-
though the defendants relied on previous cases where the courts
have held that the media was not acting under color of law,39 the
Berger Court distinguished these cases on the grounds that they
involved private entities acting independently of the government.
The cases where defendants have not been deemed state ac-
tors seem to turn on whether or not the media acted independently
of the government official. For example, in Parker v. Boyer,40
members of the St. Louis Police Department's Mobile Reserve Unit
entered the home of Sandra and Dana Parker to execute a search
warrant for cocaine, heroin, weapons, currency and drug transac-
tion records. 41 Accompanying the police officers were a television
35. See id. at 368.
36. Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
37. Berger, 129 F.3d at 515.
38. See id.
39. See United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that al-
though a police officer accompanied a theft victim to the defendant's property and
kept watch while the victim took pictures, the officer took no active part in the
search); see also United States v. Jennings, 653 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1981) (indicating
that a search of an airline package, while Drug Enforcement Administration Agent
looked on, did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because the security manager
acted for his own benefit rather than as a surrogate for the government).
40. 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996).
41. A reporter from KSDK contacted the St. Louis police and told them that he
was interested in putting together a television news story about police efforts to
eliminate illegal weapons. The police told the reporter that a weapons investiga-
tion was in progress, which he might consider covering. The investigation cen-
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reporter and a camera person from multimedia KSDK, who rode to
the scene in a police unit.42 The court held that the news media
was not acting under color of state law when it entered the home
and, therefore, could not be held liable in a civil rights action suit
brought by the homeowner.43 In reaching this conclusion, the
court said that the media acted independently of the police, and
that neither the police nor the media assisted the other." The
court relied on the facts that KSDK did not execute the search war-
rant, that they entered the house after the police did, that they
were there for reasons of their own, and that they were engaged in
a mission entirely distinct from the one that brought the police to
the house.45 The court stated that, "at most, KSDK's acts were
committed parallel to and contemporaneous with the police of-
ficers' exercise of privileges under state law."46 The court did not
attempt to reconcile the fact that KSDK rode to the scene in a po-
lice unit with its conclusion that neither the police nor the media
assisted the other. The dissent in Parker argued that the media
should be liable under § 1983 because they could not have entered
the home but for the assistance of the police. 47 The dissenting jus-
tice reasoned:
In my view, the news crew acted in concert with the police in
entering the Parkers' home. The news crew came to the loca-
tion with the police and could not have entered if the police
had not done so first. They did not simply happen along the
street at the time that a search was being conducted. 8
tered on Travis Martin, who lived with Sandra and Dana Parker. The police did
not give KSDK any instructions, nor impose any limitations on their conduct,
before the search. The KSDK personnel rode to the scene in a police car with the
police officers who executed the search warrant. The KSDK personnel followed the
police into the house. KSDK broadcast the tapes that it made at the Parkers' home
on several news programs. KSDK personnel did not seek nor obtain the Parkers'
permission to videotape the search or broadcast the footage. The district court also
noted that the chief of police testified that the department's policy was to require
the media to obtain permission to videotape from the people whose houses were
being searched. If such permission had not been obtained, the supervising officer
on the scene was not to allow the media to enter the residence because such an
entry would constitute a trespass. See id. at 446-47.
42. See id. at 446.
43. See id. at 448.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Parker, 93 F.3d at 448 (emphasis added).
47. See id. at 449 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
2000]
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Similarly, in Jones v. Taibbi,49 Jones brought a § 1983 action
against a Boston newscaster.50 The newscaster had inside infor-
mation regarding the plaintiff. In exchange for a promise to film
the arrest of the plaintiff, the newscaster promised not to publicize
what he knew about the case.5 ' The court held that the new-
scaster was not acting under color of law because there was no
"symbiotic relationship" between the police and the newscaster.52
There was merely a "coincidence of interest, but no concert of in-
volvement."53 According to the court, the police did not play any
role in determining what the newscaster would film, the new-
scaster had no part in the determination of whether or not the
plaintiff would be arrested and their respective motives were com-
pletely different from one another.54
From the above decisions, it is clear that the courts are willing
to deem the media a state actor for purposes of § 1983. Before do-
ing so, however, the courts will examine the facts surrounding each
case in order to determine the relationship between the media and
the government actors involved. It is unlikely that the courts will
go as far as to say, as did the dissent in Parker, that the media's
entry onto searched premises by virtue of government authority
would alone be sufficient to constitute joint action.55 However, the
49. 508 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1981).
50. This case centers around the "Hillside Stranglings" of 1977. During this
period, the defendant Taibbi was employed as an investigative reporter for defen-
dant Channel 5. In 1978, Taibbi learned that a prison inmate named George
Shamshak had some connection with the Hillside murders. Shamshak's story was
that plaintiff Jones had committed two or three of the murders. William Bergin, a
Massachusetts state trooper, learned of Shamshak's allegations and communi-
cated them to the LAPD. That prompted Taibbi to contact the LAPD's Strangler
Investigation Squad. Taibbi and the LAPD struck a bargain where Taibbi agreed
not to publicize what he knew about Jones' alleged involvement. In return, the
LAPD promised to allow Taibbi to film the arrest of Jones. When the arrest was
made, Taibbi was there with a camera crew to film the arrest. Police held Jones on
suspicion of involvement in the Hillside murders. Channel 5 aired the videotape of
the arrest. Ultimately, the LAPD found that Jones had an alibi and set him free.
One year later, Jones brought this action claiming $3.45 million in damages for,
among other things, a violation of civil rights. See id. at 1071-72.
51. See id. at 1073.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See id. (stating that Taibbi exercised responsible restraint). Taibbi agreed
to defer telecasting what was known to him until the LAPD felt it was warranted
in seeking an arrest. On these facts, there was no delegation of an essential public
function by the state to a private party.
55. See Parker, 93 F.3d at 448 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
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courts are willing to deem the media to have acted under color of
law when there is an agreement between the media and the gov-
ernment actor, as well as evidence that the two worked in conjunc-
tion with each other in order to achieve their own ends.
IV. ARE MEDIA DEFENDANTS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY?
If the media is deemed to be a state actor, the question of lia-
bility arises. This section of the Comment explores the possibility
of avoiding liability through the concept of qualified immunity. It
is clear from the historical justification for qualified immunity, as
well as from current case law, that it would not apply to the media.
Although not specifically stated in the statute, the creation of
the immunity defense began when the United States Supreme
Court read § 1983 as incorporating common law immunities that
were in place at the time the statute was passed.56 The immunity
defense was based on the Court's sense that it would be unfair to
hold individual government officials personally liable when they
acted in good faith, but were later determined to have violated
someone's constitutional rights.57 Through time, the immunity de-
fense was developed and refined.58 In 1982, the United States Su-
preme Court set forth a new test for qualified immunity. 59 This
test provides that federal agents are entitled to qualified immunity
if they could reasonably have believed that their conduct violated
no clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights. 60
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether
or not private individuals might be afforded qualified immunity for
a § 1983 violation in Wyatt v. Cole.61 The Court, deciding whether
or not private defendants were entitled to immunity, set forth a
two-part test: first, courts need to look at history to determine if
56. Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L.
Rev. 123, 125 (1999).
57. See id.
58. The court removed the subjective component of the defense. Because the
subjective component of the defense required resolution of factual issues, it was
difficult for a defendant to have a claim dismissed prior to trial based on qualified
immunity. This delay in the resolution of the lawsuit was thought to be unfair to
defendants because it involved them in potentially meritless litigation. See id. at
127.
59. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
60. See id. at 818.
61. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
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there has a been a tradition of immunity for a particular class of
defendants, and second, courts need to look at the policy concerns
involved in suing government officials to see if they apply to the
private actor.62 In holding that private individuals are not entitled
to qualified immunity, the Court limited its holding to private de-
fendants "faced with a § 1983 liability for invoking a state replevin,
garnishment, or attachment statute."63 Therefore, the answer to
the question of qualified immunity for all private individuals fac-
ing § 1983 liability would have to wait for another day. The an-
swer came in 1997.
In Richardson v. McKnight,64 the Supreme Court found that
qualified immunity did not apply to privately employed prison
guards operating under a contract with the state.65 The Court, re-
lying on Wyatt, came to this conclusion by examining the history as
well as the rationale of the qualified immunity defense.66 First,
the Court found that history did not reveal a "firmly rooted" tradi-
tion of immunity applicable to privately employed prison guards.67
Second, in examining the rationale for granting immunity, the
Court relied on Wyatt's articulation of the doctrine's purposes: pro-
tecting the government's ability to perform its traditional functions
by providing immunity where necessary to preserve the ability of
government officials "to serve the public good or to ensure that tal-
62. See id. at 167.
63. Id. at 168-69.
64. 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
65. Ronnie Lee McKnight, a prisoner in a Tennessee prison, brought a federal
constitutional tort action against two prison guards. He claims the guards injured
him by placing him in extremely tight physical restraints, thereby subjecting him
to the deprivation of a federal constitutional right. The defendants asserted a
qualified immunity from § 1983 lawsuits and moved to dismiss the action. The
District Court noted that Tennessee had "privatized" the management of its cor-
rectional facilities, and therefore a private firm, not the state, employed the
guards. The court held that the law did not grant the guards immunity from suit.
The guards appealed to the Sixth Circuit, where the lower court's decision was
affirmed. See id. at 401-02.
66. See id. at 402.
67. See id. at 404 (commenting that the correctional system in the United
States has undergone various transformations). Government-employed prison
guards may have enjoyed a type of immunity arising out of their status as public
employees at common law. However, correctional functions have never been exclu-
sively public. Private contractors were heavily involved in prison management
during the 19th century. There is no conclusive evidence of a tradition of immunity
for private parties carrying out these functions. History, therefore, does not pro-
vide support for the immunity claim.
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ented candidates were not deterred by the threat of damages suits
by entering public service."68 In holding that private prison
guards were not entitled to qualified immunity, the Court stated
that the most important special government immunity producing
concern-unwarranted timidity-is less present when a private com-
pany, subject to competitive market pressures, operates a prison.69
Marketplace pressures provide the private firm with strong incen-
tives to avoid overly timid, insufficiently vigorous and unduly fear-
ful job performance.70 Also, to ensure that talented candidates are
not deterred from entering public service by the threat of damages
suits, the Court stated that privatization, not immunity, meets
this need. 71 Private firms, unlike a government department, can
offset any increased employee liability risk with higher pay, extra
benefits or indemnification. 72
The Richardson ruling, however, was narrowly limited to the
specific facts presented: "the context is one in which a private firm,
systematically organized to assume a major lengthy administra-
tive task [managing an institution] with limited direct supervision
by the government, undertakes that task for profit and potentially
in competition with other firms."73 The Court went on to suggest
that immunity might apply to a private person "briefly associated
with a government body, serving as an adjunct to government in
an essential governmental activity, or acting under close official
supervision."74
Defendants facing liability under § 1983 have attempted to
distinguish Richardson and use the above language in order to re-
ceive qualified immunity. Those defendants that have tried to dis-
tinguish themselves from the security guards in Richardson,
however, have had little luck. Courts have usually found that the
defendants fell squarely within Richardson's reach and were not
distinguishable at all. In doing so, the courts looked at the work-
ing relationship between the private party defendant and the
state. For example, in Ace Beverage Co. v. Lockheed Information
68. Id. at 408.
69. See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 409.
70. See id. at 410.
71. See id. at 411.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 413.
74. Id.
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Mgmt. Serv.,75 the defendant, a private corporation that processed
parking tickets for the city of Los Angeles, argued that it fell
outside of Richardson's holding because it was under the close su-
pervision of the city. The contract between the city of Los Angeles
and Lockheed provided that Lockheed had the responsibility of
general oversight while the city would set policy and monitor per-
formance. 76 The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the corporation
was not entitled to qualified immunity.77 The court stated that
Lockheed was a private firm assuming an administrative task with
limited direct supervision by the government.78 This, the court
said, is exactly what the Supreme Court found to be inadequate to
confer qualified immunity in Richardson.79
Also illustrative of this point is McDuffie v. Hopper.80 In that
case, the son of a prisoner who committed suicide while in custody
of the state department of corrections and under the care of Correc-
tional Medical Services, Inc. (CMS), sued CMS doctors and health
care providers under § 1983 alleging cruel and unusual punish-
ment.81 The defendants argued that Richardson's narrow holding
left the door open for the District Court to distinguish them from
75. 144 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1997).
76. Lockheed Information Management Services is a private corporation that
processes parking tickets for the City of Los Angeles. Ace Beverage Company
hired a law firm to challenge their parking tickets. In retaliation, Lockheed
heightened the requirements applicable to the law firm's clients for setting ticket
disputes for trial. The law firm sued Lockheed and others pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See id. at 1219.
77. See id. at 1220.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. 982 F. Supp. 817 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
81. CMS is a Missouri corporation that contracts with the State of Alabama to
provide mental care to the state's prisoners. Roberts was an inmate in an Ala-
bama prison from 1978 until his death in 1995. Throughout his imprisonment,
Roberts suffered severe psychiatric illness. On many occasions, Roberts informed
medical staff that he was hallucinating and contemplating suicide. Roberts tried
to commit suicide at least four times. During his years in prison, Roberts was
receiving large doses of a psychotropic drug. Despite reports of suicidal thoughts
by Roberts, doctors, employed by CMS, decided to discontinue his medication. The
plaintiffs alleged that this was part of a cost cutting policy of CMS. There is evi-
dence that Roberts was not properly treated after the medicine was discontinued.
Roberts complained about the discontinuation of the medicine, but was not visited
by the medical defendants. On September 24, 1995, Roberts committed suicide by
hanging himself with a bedsheet tied to the bars of his isolation cell. See id. at
820-21.
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the prison guards in Richardson.8 2 In holding that the private
party doctors were not entitled to qualified immunity, the court
stated that the Richardson holding was not as narrow as the de-
fendants thought.8 3 The private party doctors were well within
Richardson's reach because CMS took on the management of the
medical services for all of the prisoners in Alabama prisons, and
the defendants could not show that they were strictly supervised
by the state84 In essence, the defendants could not show the court
that either CMS or its employees were "merely briefly associated
with a government body, serving as an adjunct to government in
an essential governmental activity, or acting under close official
supervision."85
Even if a court were to decide that a defendant did not fit
within Richardson's holding, the court would apply the two-part
test set forth in Wyatt. After doing so, the defendants were clearly
not entitled to qualified immunity. For example, in Malinowski v.
DeLuca,86 apartment building owners sued local officials and the
employees of a private property inspection agency, asserting fed-
eral civil rights claims in connection with a search of their building
pursuant to a special inspection warrant.8 7 Without discussing
82. See id. at 823.
83. See id. at 824.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. 177 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1999).
87. In 1983, the Malinowskis purchased a four-unit apartment building in the
Village of Twin Lakes ("the Village"). From 1983 to 1987, the Malinowskis made
improvements, without the proper permits, to convert the building from a four-
unit to a six-unit apartment complex. In 1992, the Village became aware that the
Malinowskis had converted the property without the required permits. The Vil-
lage informed the Malinowskis that they were in violation of the Village's building
codes. The Village's building inspector was employed by a private company, Inde-
pendent Inspections, Ltd. An anonymous complaint was lodged with the Village
by a resident of the apartment building concerning alleged safety code violations at
the converted apartments. The defendant-appellant DeLuca, who was employed
by Independent Inspections, Ltd., began researching the property. DeLuca at-
tempted to inspect the inside of the apartment building on two occasions. After
two failed attempts, DeLuca obtained a special inspection warrant to inspect the
premises, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.122. The inspectors, along with two Village
police officers, were allowed onto the premises without objection. The inspection
revealed numerous code violations. The Malinowskis filed suit, alleging that
DeLuca and others violated the Malinowskis' civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
executing the special inspection warrant. The Malinowskis alleged that during the
search they were seized and that excessive force was used during the seizure. See
id. at 624-25.
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Richardson's holding specifically, the Seventh Circuit discussed
the two-part test set forth by the Court in Wyatt: the origins of the
immunity doctrine and the rationale for granting the immunity.88
The court stated that the defendants did not meet the first prong of
the test because they failed to cite any cases or evidence to lend
support to the notion that private building inspectors have histori-
cally been granted qualified immunity.8 9 The court also said that
the second prong was not met because the defendants failed to es-
tablish anything special enough about the job or its organizational
structure to warrant an extension of governmental immunity.9°
Also, in Rodriquez v. McLoughlin,91 a foster parent sued a
child placement service seeking damages for the temporary re-
moval of a foster child from her home in violation of her procedural
due process rights.92 In holding that the employees of the agency
were not entitled to qualified immunity, the court reviewed Wyatt's
two-part test. According to the court, "neither consideration com-
pels a grant of qualified immunity to the individual defendants in
this case."9 3 There was no evidence that there was a tradition of
governmental immunity for private parties engaged in foster
care94 and the agency was subject to competitive market pressures
operating pursuant to a contract with the city.95 Therefore, the
88. See id. at 626.
89. See id. at 627.
90. See id.
91. 49 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
92. This action arose out of Cardinal McCloskey Children's and Family Ser-
vices' removal of a former foster child, Les Andrew Kelly, from the home of his
former foster, now adoptive, mother, Sylvia Rodriguez, on March 18, 1994. Ms.
Rodriguez was the foster mother for Andrew and for Thomas Green, who was three
years old. Ms. Rodriguez's grandson, Edwin who was 12 years old, was also living
with her. When Mr. Monplaisir, employee of McCloskey, arrived at Ms. Rodri-
quez's home for a visit, he found only Edwin supervising Andrew and Thomas.
Edwin appeared to be to be overwhelmed. Mr. Monplaisir left the apartment and
called his supervisor. He was instructed to return to the apartment and stay with
the children. After returning to the apartment, Mr. Monplaisir was instructed, by
his supervisor, to remove Andrew and Thomas from Ms. Rodriguez's home. See id.
at 188-91.
93. Id. at 207.
94. See id. The care of foster children was not traditionally the exclusive pre-
rogative of the state, and foster care workers employed by the government were
not necessarily entitled to qualified immunity. Although one court found that
qualified immunity would be appropriate for private foster care workers, the deci-
sions upon which it relied, predated Richardson. See id.
95. See id. Because the McCloskey agency was subject to competitive market
pressures, operating pursuant to a contract with the city, the agency had an incen-
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court stated that the McClosky agency was similar, although not
identical, to the entity in Richardson.96
In rare instances, courts have allowed qualified immunity for
private parties because they fell outside of Richardson's holding
and they satisfied Wyatt's two-part test. For example, in Raby v.
Baptist Medical Center,97 the plaintiff sued a medical center, its
supervisors and its police officers for violation of § 1983 by using
excessive force in apprehending the plaintiff.98 The Raby court
stated that Richardson's holding was narrow and, since the facts of
the case did not include a contract with the government for per-
formance of a lengthy administrative task, the case was outside of
Richardson's reach.99 However, the court looked to the history of
qualified immunity and the purposes that underlie qualified im-
munity to determine if the private actor was entitled to qualified
immunity.100 Although the majority found that police officers have
traditionally been protected by at least some form of immunity, the
Raby court recognized that Richardson made clear that "historical
information regarding police officers does not speak to the exis-
tive not to be unduly timid in protecting the children under its care. The court
indicated that the agency had an incentive to discharge its duties responsibly, so
that its contract with the city would be renewed. Thus a significant justification
for qualified immunity, to insure responsible job performance by governmental em-
ployees, was not present in this case. See id.
96. See id. at 208.
97. 21 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
98. Jeffery Raby brought claims based on events that occurred when he was
arrested by Baptist Medical Center police officers. Although the Baptist Medical
Center is a private organization, the Alabama Legislature has passed a law by
which Baptist Medical Center is given the authority to appoint police officers.
Raby's car was parked in the parking lot of Montgomery Cardiovascular Institute.
Raby entered the Center and while he was inside, defendant, a Baptist Medical
Center police officer, noted the license number on Raby's car. When Raby emerged
from the Center, the officer asked for identification and Raby complied. The officer
radioed the information in and was told that Raby should be arrested for trespass-
ing because of a court order stemming from a prior trespassing conviction. When
the officer attempted to arrest Raby, Raby got into his car and locked the doors.
The officer placed his arm in the window and demanded that Raby exit the vehicle.
Another Baptist Medical Center police officer then arrived on the scene. The sec-
ond officer attempted to break the car window with his baton while the first officer
attempted to unlock the passenger-side door. What happened next is contested.
The second officer moved either directly in front of or to the side of Raby's car and
shot him through the windshield, either as or before Raby drove off. The officers
then chased Raby to the Center where they and an additional officer pinned him
on the floor and handcuffed him. See id. at 1345.
99. See id. at 1356.
100. See id.
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tence of immunities for private persons employed as police of-
ficers." 10 1 However, the court stated that "whether or not the
historical existence of immunities for police officers fits the first
Richardson prong... it does point to the significance of the purpose
of immunities within the context of law enforcement."10 2
So, at least as far as this court was concerned, the first prong
was satisfied. In finding that the second prong was also satisfied,
the court stated that the concerns focused on in Richardson were
not relevant in this case. 10 3 In Raby, the court stated that the
Baptist Medical Center did not have the same competitive pres-
sures that were identified in Richardson because the Medical
Center was not competing for government contracts, and the de-
fendants were not performing tasks incidental to the entity's main
purpose-providing medical services.' 0 4 Therefore, the Center had
less of an interest in the way the individuals were performing their
jobs. 10 5 In other words, the policy concerns that had prompted the
courts to apply qualified immunity to police officers, also applied to
these privatized police officers regardless of the fact that this has
not traditionally been the case.10 6
Another case that illustrates this point is Bartell v. Lohiser. '0 7
In Bartell, the plaintiff, whose parental rights were terminated,
sued numerous defendants including the state, the Michigan Fam-
ily Independent Agency, state social workers, a private foster care
contractor and private social workers, alleging a violation of her
civil rights.' 08 In holding that the foster care worker was entitled
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. See Raby, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1357. In Richardson, the Court reasoned that
private employees are different from government employees because a private firm
can respond to market pressures via rewards and penalties that operate directly
on employees. The Court also reasoned that the private firm's organizational
structure is one which is subject to the ordinary competitive pressures that help
them adjust their behavior to the incentives that tort suits bring. See Richardson,
521 U.S. at 409-10.
104. See Raby, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1357.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. 12 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
108. The plaintiffs were the biological parents of William Stanley. The mother
sought help from Jackson County FIA in 1988 because of William's aggressive be-
havior. The FIA responded by providing parent aides. In September, 1992, Jack-
son County Protective Services began investigating the mother because of
complaints that she was abusing her children and engaging in violent fights with
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to qualified immunity, the court stated that the facts in this case
fell outside Richardson's reach. 10 9 This case fell into the area that
Richardson expressly did not address: whether qualified immunity
would shield private parties briefly associated with a government
body, serving as an adjunct to government in an essential govern-
mental activity, or acting under close official supervision. 110 This
is due to the fact that when the state purchases foster care services
from an outside agency, the state assigns its own foster care
worker to monitor the services provided."' The monitor's duties
include evaluating the appropriateness of the plans developed, as
well as consulting and assisting the caseworker throughout the
process.1 2 Under these circumstances, the court stated that there
was no doubt that the defendants were acting as an adjunct to gov-
ernment in the essential activity of protecting wards of the
state."13 Although the court did not address the first prong of the
two-part test-historical use of qualified immunity-the second
prong was satisfied because the agency was a non-profit organiza-
tion and without immunity, the defendants would not be free to
make unbiased recommendations without the risk of being
William's father. Parent aides were then assigned. Defendant Lohiser was the
supervisor of the parent aide program. The mother sought treatment for William's
problems and voluntarily placed him in the St. Louis Center. The St. Louis Center
is a residential facility for mentally disabled and emotionally impaired boys. Wil-
ham stayed in the center for one year until he was discharged due to behavioral
problems. Plaintiff mother claims that Lohiser then persuaded her to place Wil-
liam in foster care by assuring her that William would be returned to her once she
was able to care for him. Bartell asked to have William returned to her in Decem-
ber 1994. Shortly thereafter, Lohiser filed a petition asking the court to take over
jurisdiction of William. The court denied the petition and returned William to his
mother. Protective services filed a second petition to place William in temporary
custody. A hearing was held and the petition was granted. The judge ruled that
removal of the child from the custody of the mother was necessary to protect him
from substantial risk of harm. After William was placed under the care of FIA, the
agency contracted with LSS to provide foster care services. The FIA supervisor
testified that the state purchases foster care services when the state is unable to
meet the needs of a particular child. Because the plaintiff had problems control-
ling William's behavior, her visitation was reduced from unsupervised to super-
vised. After William had been in foster care through LSS for one year, LSS
requested that plaintiff's parental rights be terminated. A hearing was held and
the judge terminated the plaintiff's parental rights. See id. at 642-44.
109. See id. at 645.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 646.
112. See id. at 647.
113. See Bartell, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 647.
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sued.114 If private, non-profit foster care agencies were not availa-
ble to contract with the state, additional burdens would be placed
on the state's limited budget. 1 5
It is clear from the above cases that media defendants would
not fall within the reach of Richardson's holding because they are
neither privately operated, systematically organized to assume a
major lengthy administrative task with limited direct supervision
by the government, nor are they undertaking that task for profit
and potentially in competition with other firms. However, as we
have seen, media defendants could still be entitled to qualified im-
munity if they meet the two-part test. This appears unlikely, how-
ever, because even if the media could show a firmly rooted
tradition of immunity for the media, they would fail on the second
prong. Similar to the security guards in Richardson, the media are
part of private industry and is subject to the ordinary competitive
pressures that provide the "industry" with strong incentives to
avoid overly timid employee job performance. Talented candidates
are not deterred by the threat of damages suits because the media
industry can provide indemnification, higher pay and better bene-
fits to offset any risks. In sum, there is nothing special enough
about the media or its organizational structure that would warrant
providing it with a governmental immunity.
V. ARE MEDIA DEFENDANTS ENTITLED TO A
GOOD FAiTH DEFENSE?
Although the courts are unwilling, in most cases, to expand
the qualified immunity doctrine to private parties subject to § 1983
liability, they are willing to entertain an affirmative defense of
good faith. This section of the Comment analyzes the concept of a
good faith defense and its application to private parties. It is clear
from the following that a good faith defense is different from quali-
fied immunity in theory; however, it is very similar in its applica-
tion. A good faith defense will require that the plaintiff show that
the defendant had a subjective appreciation that his or her acts
deprived the plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights. Since this
requires a factual inquiry, the defendant cannot have the case dis-
missed as quickly as someone who is entitled to qualified immu-
114. See id. at 646.
115. See id.
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nity. Ultimately, the media will be entitled to a good faith defense
as long as the plaintiff fails to show that the media acted with sub-
jective appreciation that its actions violated the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights.
Few courts have had to address the issue of a good faith de-
fense for private parties. This is due, in part, to the fact that
courts were busy addressing the question of immunity for private
parties-not the question of an affirmative defense. The Supreme
Court first acknowledged the idea of a good faith defense in Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co.116 Justice Powell, writing for the dissent,
was concerned that private individuals who innocently make use of
valid state laws would be responsible for the consequences of their
actions if the law were subsequently held to be unconstitutional."17
In the majority's view, however, this problem should be dealt with
not by changing the character of the cause of action, but by estab-
lishing an affirmative defense."i 8
Realizing that private parties could be held liable under
§ 1983, and would not receive immunity, courts attempted to fig-
ure out what this affirmative defense of good faith would be. In
Duncan v. Peck, "19 the Sixth Circuit noted that qualified immunity
was designed to protect potential defendants from having to defend
a suit by dismissing the suit up front; 20 whereas a good faith de-
fense is likely to be based in large part on the facts of the case, with
the suit only being dismissed after trial or on summary judgment if
the defendant can show that there is no material dispute as to the
facts.121
The first attempt at setting the parameters of the good faith
defense came in Wyatt v. Cole. ' 22 In this case, a rancher brought a
§ 1983 action against his partner, who had invoked the state re-
plevin statute, and his partner's attorney, challenging the constitu-
116. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
117. See id. at 942 (Powell, J., dissenting).
118. See id.
119. 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988).
120. See generally Hassel, supra note 56 (noting that in theory, by eliminating
the subjective element from the qualified immunity test, the determination of
whether or not it applies to a defendant can be resolved at the outset of a lawsuit).
In reality, the defense of qualified immunity does not quickly resolve a lawsuit.
The issues surrounding the case require a fact-finding hearing which makes it dif-
ficult to end lawsuits before trial. See id. at 149-50.
121. See Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1266.
122. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
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tionality of a state replevin statute and seeking injunctive relief
and damages. 123 The Supreme Court held that qualified immunity
was not available to private defendants charged with § 1983 liabil-
ity for invoking state replevin, garnishment, or attachment stat-
utes.124 However, the court stated that "although it may be that
private defendants faced with § 1983 liability under Lugar could
be entitled to an affirmative good faith defense, or that § 1983 suits
against private, rather than governmental, parties could require
plaintiffs to carry additional burdens, those issues are neither
before the Court nor decided here."125 On remand, the Fifth Cir-
cuit determined that private defendants sued under § 1983 may be
held liable for damages only if they failed to act in good faith in
invoking the unconstitutional state procedures. 126 In other words,
defendants may be held liable if they acted with malice or either
knew or should have known that the statute upon which they re-
lied was unconstitutional. 27
Since then, other courts have dealt with the issue of an affirm-
ative defense and have attempted to flesh out the defense further.
123. Respondent Cole sought to dissolve his cattle partnership with petitioner
Wyatt. When negotiations failed, Cole and his attorney filed a state court com-
plaint in replevin against Wyatt, accompanied by a replevin bond. At that time,
Mississippi law provided that an individual could obtain a court order for seizure
of property possessed by another by posting a bond and swearing that the appli-
cant was entitled to that property and that the adversary wrongfully took or
wrongfully detained the property. The statute did not give the judge discretion to
deny a writ of replevin. The court ordered the county sheriff to seize cattle and
certain other personal property from Wyatt. Several months later, the court dis-
missed Cole's complaint in replevin and ordered that the property be returned to
Wyatt. Cole refused to comlly with the court order. Wyatt filed suit in Federal
District Court challenging the constitutionality of the statute, and seeking injunc-
tive relief and damages. The District Court held that the statute's failure to afford
judges discretion to deny writs of replevin violated due process. See id. at 159-60.
124. See id. at 168-69.
125. Id. at 159.
126. See Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that Congress, in enacting § 1983, leg-
islated against a background of common-law tort liability). The Court has read
§ 1983 to include general principles of tort immunities and defenses, although
§ 1983 admits no immunities on its face. In Wyatt, the Supreme Court identified
malicious prosecution as the common-law cause of action most similar to Wyatt's
claim. All of the Supreme Court Justices agreed that plaintiffs seeking to recover
on malicious prosecution had to prove that the defendants acted with malice and
without probable cause.
127. See id. at 1121.
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In Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel,128 the plaintiff
brought a § 1983 action against defendant and defendant's attor-
neys for depriving the plaintiff of his due process rights.129 The
Third Circuit, referring to the holding in Wyatt, agreed with the
Fifth Circuit's basic interpretation of a good faith defense; how-
ever, the court held that "malice" meant "a subjective appreciation
that the [defendant's] acts deprived the [plaintiff] of his constitu-
tional right [to due process]."130
The courts have also determined that a good faith defense de-
pends on the defendant's subjective state of mind, which requires a
factual inquiry. For example, In Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard &
Howard,13 1 the manufacturer of crash test dummies brought a
§ 1983 claim against a rival manufacturer and the manufacturer's
attorneys arising out of a search and seizure.1 32 The Sixth Circuit,
affirming the denial of a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, held that the
attorney defendants had a good faith defense.1 33 However, a good
faith defense rested on subjective intent, which required a factual
inquiry.' 34 Such a factual inquiry could not be resolved on a Rule
12 motion and, therefore, would need to be resolved on remand.' 35
128. 20 F.3d 1250 (3rd Cir. 1993).
129. This action arises out of a dispute over a commercial lease between the
Bermans, commercial landlords who rent office space in Philadelphia, and one of
their tenants, Jordan Mitchell, Inc., an architectural firm. The Bermans' attor-
neys invoked a confession of judgment clause in a form lease executed by the Ten-
ant's predecessor causing the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas to enter
judgment against the Tenant for rents the Bermans claim Jordan Mitchell, Inc.
owes. On the judgment, the Sheriff of Philadelphia garnished Jordan Mitchell,
Inc.'s checking account without prior notice or hearing. See id. at 1253.
130. Id. at 1277.
131. 76 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 1996).
132. First Technology Safety Systems, Inc. (FTSS) asserted that Vector Re-
search, Inc. had violated the Copyright Act, stolen trade secrets, and violated em-
ployee confidentiality agreements. FTSS obtained an ex parte order authorizing
the seizure of evidence of Vector's alleged wrongful conduct. The court held that
the ex parte order was invalid and that its issuance was an abuse of discretion.
Vector sued the private participants in the search and seizure in Ohio state court
on tort theories. The individual plaintiffs then added Bivens federal constitutional
claims after the defendants removed the case to federal court. The defendants
moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, and the district court granted the motion. The
plaintiffs appealed. See id. at 695.
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The courts have also determined that the plaintiff bore the
burden of proof in these cases. For example, in Robinson v. City of
San Bernardino Police Department,136 a former state prisoner
brought a § 1983 action against city police officers and a certified
phlebotomist for injuries he suffered as a result of a sexual exami-
nation.137 The United States District Court of California held that
the phlebotomist was entitled to a good faith defense because she
conducted the examination at the direction of the police officers
and she believed that the police had probable cause-or a search
warrant-to perform the exam. 138 Although the court agreed that a
good faith defense rests on the subjective state of mind of the de-
fendant, the court granted summary judgment in the defendant's
favor because the plaintiff had not submitted any evidence that the
defendant had acted in bad faith.139 In Jordan, the Third Circuit
also agreed that a good faith defense depends on the defendant's
subjective state of mind and that the burden of proof rests with the
plaintiff.14° The court, looking to the language used by the Su-
preme Court in Wyatt and Lugar, concluded that "good faith gives
state actors a defense that depends on their subjective state of
mind, rather than the more demanding objective standard of rea-
sonable belief that governs qualified immunity."141
In theory, an affirmative good faith defense is different from
qualified immunity. However, in practice, it seems that a good
faith defense rests upon the same logic as qualified immunity. In
order for a person who may be entitled to qualified immunity to
136. 992 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
137. The plaintiff alleged that following his arrest, defendants subjected him to
a "sexual examination," which was performed in a manner violative of numerous
federal constitutional rights. The examination was conducted by defendant
Vielma, while other defendants held plaintiffs legs and arms. Later, the plaintiff
began to feel pain and noticed swelling and bruises. He saw a doctor, who discov-
ered that plaintiff's left leg had been squeezed so tightly that the blood clotted.
The doctor testified that permanent disfiguration of the skin tissue resulted from
the initial pressure applied to the plaintiffs legs. See id. at 1201.
138. See id. at 1207.
139. See id.
140. See Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1277-78.
141. Id. at 1277 (articulating some of the concerns that the Supreme Court ex-
pressed in Lugar and Wyatt). In particular, the court states that persons asserting
§ 1983 claims against private parties could be required to carry additional burdens
and that Lugar warns that an extension of § 1983 to private parties could destroy
the Fourteenth Amendments limitation to state actions depriving a person of con-
stitutional rights.
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receive the benefits of the immunity, it must be shown that his or
her conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or consti-
tutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 142
In essence, this is what must be found in order for a defendant to
be entitled to a good faith defense: the defendant must have had a
subjective appreciation that his or her acts deprived the plaintiff of
his or her constitutional rights. The former, then, is objective,
while the latter is subjective. While one resolves the case up front,
the other requires further factual inquiry. One can be dismissed at
the outset while the other can only be dismissed after factual find-
ings are made.
So, in the case of the media, does it not follow that if the police
or federal agents are entitled to qualified immunity because there
was no clearly established law at the time of the offense, 143 then
the media-who rely on the fact that police had probable cause, or
at least a search warrant-would be entitled to a good faith de-
fense? In other words, if the government agent did not know he or
she was violating clearly established law, it should follow that the
media defendant did not know either. In any event, it is up to the
plaintiffs who are bringing suits against the media under § 1983 to
show that the media knew it was violating the plaintiffs constitu-
tional rights. This will be difficult for plaintiffs to do in cases that
arose before Wilson v. Layne. 144 Going forward, however, the police
and the media are on notice.
VI. PLAINTIFF'S REMEDIES UNDER § 1983
Why are constitutional remedies necessary when general tort
remedies-trespass or invasion of privacy-are already available?
This section attempts to answer this question as well as give some
insight behind the remedy of attorney's fees that are available
under this statute. In essence, § 1983 offers the plaintiff a more
complete and satisfying remedy than would a remedy under com-
mon law.
142. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16.
143. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (holding that it was not
unreasonable for a police officer in April 1992 to have believed that bringing media
observers along during the execution of an arrest warrant was lawful).
144. See id.
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Common law tort actions may "have little, if any, actual
bite."145 As the media's "involvement" in law enforcement activi-
ties increased, traditional tort actions against the media increased
as well. 146 However, the ability of common law tort actions to pro-
tect the plaintiff is questionable. 147 A remedy should be available
for what actually occurs-a violation of a constitutional right. 48 It
is not a simple trespass or invasion of privacy issue; "it is a state-
supported trespass or invasion of privacy which is an abuse of gov-
ernment power."14 9 To have a court say that the defendant vio-
lated the plaintiffs constitutional rights has more significance to
the plaintiff than to have the court say that the defendant tres-
passed on plaintiffs property or invaded his privacy.
A remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Fourth
Amendment will be more complete because a prevailing plaintiff
can recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.150 It is this
point that is arguably the most important reason that a plaintiff
would seek damages under § 1983. Attorney's fees are important
for two reasons. The first, and least glamorous, reason is that at-
145. C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 311,
380 (1997); see also Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell
to Warren and Brandeis' Privacy Tort, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 291, 362 (1983) (articu-
lating that privacy torts have little power).
146. See Note, Privacy, Technology, and the California "Anti-Paparazzi" Stat-
ute, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1367, 1369 (1999).
147. See Eve Klindera, Qualified Immunity For Cops (And Other Public Offi-
cials) With Cameras: Let Common Law Remedies Ensure Press Responsibility, 67
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 399, 416 (1999) (explaining that in order to prove invasion of
privacy, the plaintiff must show that an intrusion occurred, that he or she had an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the place intruded, and that the
defendant intruded upon the plaintiffs privacy in a manner highly offensive to a
reasonable person). When the intruder is gathering news, courts require a signifi-
cant showing of offensiveness. In order to prove trespass, a plaintiff must demon-
strate an intentional entry upon land that he possesses. Consent is a defense to
trespass. The media can defeat a trespass claim by claiming implied or express
consent.
148. Johnston, supra note 2, at 1527 n.126.
149. Id.
150. "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or section
13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, includ-
ing attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer's juris-
diction." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
MEDIA IN THE SPOTLIGHT
torneys will be more willing to take a civil rights action if they can
be assured of attorney's fees-damages may be relatively minor, but
fees fully compensate the attorney. The second, and perhaps more
important, reason is that Congress felt these actions were so im-
portant that they devised a way to ensure that plaintiffs would be
encouraged to bring them forth.'5 1 Attorney's fees, then, give at-
torneys, as well as plaintiffs, incentive to bring civil rights viola-
tions out into the forefront.
VII. CONCLUSION
The media has been placed in the "judicial spotlight." Courts
are more willing to hold the media a "state actor" for purposes of
§ 1983 liability when it is found that the media and the govern-
ment actor have an agreement and that this agreement is to help
one or the other achieve its own end. When this happens, the gov-
ernment actor, in most cases, will receive qualified immunity and
the media will not.
For cases brought to trial before Wilson and Hanlon, the me-
dia will be entitled to a good faith defense as long as the plaintiff
fails to show that the media acted in bad faith. This should not be
an issue considering there was no law prior to Wilson and Hanlon
that clearly established that the media's presence during the exe-
cution of a warrant was unconstitutional. However, going forward,
there will no longer be a good faith defense for the media now that
they are on notice. This conclusion is limited to the media's pres-
ence in the execution of a warrant in the plaintiffs home. Other
circumstances in which the media is present with the government
may have a different result, but the analysis will be the same.
Once deemed a state actor, the only defense that the media has to
a § 1983 action is an affirmative one-the defense of good faith.
Sheila M. Lombardi
151. See Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 993 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (ex-
plaining that the primary purpose of the FOIA attorney fee provision is virtually
identical to the purpose underlying section 1988: "the fundamental purpose of [sec-
tion 1988 is] to facilitate citizen access to the courts to vindicate their statutory
rights"); see also Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704,
711 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting S.Rep. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), "[t]oo
often the barriers presented by court costs and attorneys' fees are insurmountable
for the average person requesting information").
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